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Affective “Theory of Mind” (ToM) is the specific ability to represent own and others’
emotional states and feelings. Previous studies examined affective ToM ability in patients
with Huntington’s disease (HD), using the “Reading the Mind in the Eyes test” (RMET).
Results were consistent in showing difficulties in inferring complex mental states from
photographs of people even in the early stage of HD. However, there has been no
agreement as to whether or not cognitive impairments in HD population might have
contributed to poor performance on the RMET test. The aim of the present study
was to assess whether the affective ToM ability was impaired in the mild to moderate
stages of HD, and whether there was an association between compromised ToM ability
and the presence of cognitive impairment. We evaluated ToM by means of RMET and
global cognitive functioning by means of the MoCA questionnaire in 15 HD patients and
15 healthy subjects (HS). Both groups were matched for age and level of education.
Our study showed that the ability to judge a person’s mental states from a picture
of their eyes was impaired in HD patients compared to normal population. Indeed,
HD subjects gave the 34% of correct responses on RMET, whereas healthy control
subjects’ percentage of correct responses was 71%. Furthermore, this impairment was
not correlated with global cognitive functioning except for the visuospatial task. These
results show that RMET might represent a valid instrument to assess affective ToM
ability in HD patients in the mild to moderate stages of the disease, independently
from their cognitive status. Since it is known that HD patients, in addition to motor
symptoms, suffer from cognitive deficits, including memory and executive impairments,
it is important to have an instrument, which is not influenced by cognitive abilities. It is
possible therefore to use RMET to assess important aspects of HD patients such as
their ability to recognize others’ emotions and feelings even when patients suffer from
cognitive decline.
Keywords: Huntington’s disease, theory of mind, reading the mind in the eyes test, social cognition, cognitive
impairment
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INTRODUCTION
Huntington’s disease (HD) is a hereditary neurodegenerative
disorder, caused by an expansion of CAG triplet repeats in
the Huntingtin gene on chromosome 4. Clinically, HD is
characterized by motor symptoms (chorea, slowed saccadic
eye movement, and abnormal posturing) as well as by
impairment of cognitive abilities. Robust evidence demonstrated
that cognitive decline might precede the onset of motor
symptoms being associated with meaningful outcomes, including
loss of accustomed work and poor quality of life (Paulsen,
2011). HD patients present a broad range of psychological
disturbances such as cognitive rigidity, mood disturbances, lack
of empathy and breakdowns of social relationships that might
also manifest even before the onset of motor dysfunction (Marvel
and Paradiso, 2004). In accordance, recent studies indicated
that patients with HD present deficits in “social cognition”
(Bora et al., 2016; Maurage et al., 2016), a problem that
has been already recognized in schizophrenia (Frith, 1992)
and more recently in fronto-striatal disorders (Modinos et al.,
2009).
The term “social cognition” embraces several subdomains
including the ability of recognizing what others feel, think or
do from facial expression, prosody or body posture (Uekermann
et al., 2010). Social cognition regards how people make sense
of other people and themselves. It focuses on how ordinary
people think and feel about people and on how they think and
feel about people (Fiske and Taylor, 2013). A core component
of “social cognition” is the concept of Theory of Mind (ToM),
which refers to the ability to infer other people’s mental states in
terms of beliefs, desires or intentions (Premack and Woodruff,
1978; Baron-Cohen et al., 1985). Although this concept has
been generally treated as a unitary process, some authors have
argued for a distinction between “cognitive” and “affective”
ToM (Shamay-Tsoory and Aharon-Peretz, 2007), depending
on specific task demands. Briefly, cognitive ToM corresponds
to the knowledge about others’ beliefs or intentions (Brothers
and Ring, 1992; Coricelli, 2005), whereas affective aspects of
ToM refer to the appreciation of the others’ emotional states
(Brothers and Ring, 1992). This distinction has also been
supported by imaging studies providing evidence that affective
ToM is mostly impaired by ventromedial frontal lobe damage,
whereas cognitive ToM is reduced by extensive prefrontal lesions
(Hynes et al., 2006; Vollm et al., 2006; Shamay-Tsoory and
Aharon-Peretz, 2007). In order to shed light on the complex
mechanisms underlying ToM ability, some studies tried to
deepen the relationship between ToM and cognitive abilities,
focusing in particular on executive functions (EF) in normal
population (Carlson et al., 2002; Ahmed and Stephen Miller,
2011). Circumstantial evidence for a link between EF and
ToM comes from the fact that they both share a common
developmental timetable, developing mainly in the preschool
period (Reed et al., 1984; Zelazo et al., 1997), and that both
sets of skills appear to be subserved by the prefrontal cortex
in adults (Frith and Frith, 1999; Sabbagh and Taylor, 2000).
Anyway, results in the literature are not univocal. In fact it
is important to note that, in adult population, ToM can be
assessed using different tests: Reading the Mind in the Eyes
test (RMET) (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001), Strange Stories test
(Happé, 1994), Faux Pas test (Gregory et al., 2002). Each test
utilizes different cognitive mechanisms, implying that different
cognitive processes are associated with different domains of ToM.
For example, none of the EF variables was related to RMET
performance (Ahmed and Stephen Miller, 2011). Finally, Fine
et al. (2001) reported a case study of a patient suffering from
amygdala damage who showed to be severely impaired in ToM,
but did not show any impairment in his EF abilities (Fine et al.,
2001).
Investigating affective ToM in HD proved to be useful
for explaining why patients with HD can experience social
difficulties and interpersonal problems, such as changes in
empathy (Snowden et al., 2003). One popular test to assess
affective ToM ability is the RMET (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001).
In this test, the participant is presented with a series of 25
photographs of the eye region of different actors and actresses,
and is asked to choose which of two words best describes
what the person in the photograph is thinking or feeling.
The “affective” ToM, as tested by means of the RMET, is
mainly related to social and perceptive components, including
the capacities involved in making fast empathic mental and
evaluative judgments about people and their actions. Two studies
(Allain et al., 2011; Eddy et al., 2012) investigated the “affective”
aspect of ToM in patients with HD by means of the RMET
test. Results showed consistent difficulties in inferring complex
mental states from photographs of people even in the early stage
of HD. However, these studies were inconsistent in disclosing
whether cognitive impairments in HD population might have
contributed to poor performance on the RMET test. Indeed the
authors found that low scores on the RMET were associated
with poor scores on verbal fluency task (Allain et al., 2011;
Eddy et al., 2012) and on the Stroop test (Allain et al., 2011),
whereas general cognitive function, assessed using the Mini
Mental State Examination (MMSE) (Folstein et al., 1975) and
the Mattis dementia rating scale (MDRS) (Mattis, 1976), did
not apparently influence RMET performance (Allain et al.,
2011). Such discrepancies might be related to the fact that HD
population recruited for the latter study was early in the course
of the disease and it is largely accepted that in HD cognitive
impairments are selective in preclinical and early stages (with
deficits in attention and executive function) and become more
widespread in the later stages of the disease (Papoutsi et al.,
2014).
The Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MoCA, Nasreddine
et al., 2005) is a brief screening instrument for dementia that
is thought to assess a broader array of cognitive domains
(e.g., attention/executive functioning, visuospatial abilities and
language) compared to other screening instruments. MoCA has
been demonstrated to be able to detect cognitive impairment
across a wide range of severity in HD, and to be even more
sensitive than MMSE (Folstein et al., 1975) for detecting mild
to moderate cognitive impairment in HD population (Videnovic
et al., 2010), suggesting it is a useful screening measure of
cognitive performance in HD (Videnovic et al., 2010; Gluhm
et al., 2013).
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The aim of the present study was, first of all, to deepen our
knowledge about the ability of affective Tom in HD patients,
particularly when they are in mild to moderate stages of the
disease, in order to observe if any difference was present in
ToM performance in comparison with patients in the early
stage of the disease (Allain et al., 2011). Then, we aimed to
examine if affective ToM was correlated to the global cognitive
functioning, in order to investigate whether affective ToM
task might represent a valuable instrument for studying social
cognition in HD population independently from global cognitive
dysfunction. To this aim, the MoCA questionnaire and the RMET
were administered to HD patients in mild to moderate stages of
the disease.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Fifteen patients (eight males, seven females) with HD were
recruited from the outpatient Movement Disorders Clinic of the
University of Genoa. The diagnosis of HD had been confirmed
by genetic testing. Seven patients were taking fixed doses of
psychiatric medication to address mood changes and/or anxiety
and 13 were treated with medication to reduce choreic symptoms.
At the time of the assessment, patients’ mean age was 53.6 years
(range: 30–62 years, SD = ±9.6), level of education ranged from
5 to 18 years of schooling (mean: 11.86; SD=±3.6) and the mean
illness duration was 8.1 years (range: 1–20 years, SD = ±5.7).
Regarding the severity of the disease, nine patients were in the
mild whilst six patients were in the moderate stage, according
to the Total Functional Capacity Scale. Patients were excluded
in the presence of past history of neurological conditions other
than HD, and severe visual impairments. The control group (HS)
consisted of six males and nine females. Their mean age was
60.4 years (SD=± 10.1; Range: 35–70), level of education ranged
from 7 to 18 years of schooling (mean: 14.4; SD = ±3.9). In the
HS group, during the recruitment phase, the following exclusion
criteria were applied: (1) history of psychiatric and neurological
disorders, (2) major depression, diagnosed by means of DSM
IV criteria; and (3) general intellectual impairment (defined by
means of MMSE age- and education- adjusted score < 24).
Demographic and clinical features of HD and HS are summarized
in Table 1.
TABLE 1 | Demographic and clinical characteristics.
HD (n = 15) HS (n = 15) Chi-square
Mean ± SD Mean ± SD
Age (years) 53.6 ± 9.6 60.4 ± 10.1 χ2: p = 0.10
Education (years) 11.86 ± 3.6 14.4 ± 3.9 χ2: p = 0.13
Disease duration (years) 8.1 ± 5.7 – –
UHDRS motor score 36 ± 19.5 – –
TFC score 10.9 ± 2.15 – –
HD, Huntington Disease; HS, healthy subjects; UHDRS, Unified Huntington
Disease Rating Scale; TFC, Total Functional Capacity.
Procedure
Participants were naïve to the purpose of the experiment and
gave written informed consent after reading information leaflets
about the study. Informed consent was obtained according to
a procedure approved by the local ethics committee (Comitato
Etico Regione Liguria, IRCCS Azienda Ospedaliera Universitaria
San Martino—IST, Genoa, Italy) and to the Declaration of
Helsinki. All participants underwent a neuropsychological
battery of test and only HD patients were evaluated on their
motor and general abilities (Table 2).
Motor Evaluation
A movement disorder specialist examined the participants and
rated the presence and severity of 15 individual motor signs using
the UHDRS Motor Assessment (Huntington Study Group, 1996).
The sum of motor signs can range from 0 to 124 with higher
scores indicating more impaired motor function.
Total Functional Capacity (TFC)
A standardized scale was administered to patients in order to
assess their capacity to work, handle finances, perform domestic
chores and self-care tasks, and live independently. This scale was
used to stratify manifest HD subjects as mild (TFC = 10–13) or
moderate (TFC= 7–9) (Gluhm et al., 2013).
ToM Task
The revised version of the RMET (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001)
was used to assess the affective ToM ability. Participants were
asked to imagine being inside the mind of the person shown
in the photograph and subsequently attribute a mental state to
them, trying to give a semantic definition of a possible mental
state (“frightened” or “suspicious” for example). This process
is assumed to involve an unconscious, automatic and rapid
matching of past memories concerning similar expressions with
a lexicon of mental state terms (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001).
Specifically, the RMET task comprised a series of 36 photographs,
of the eye region of a Caucasian actor (19 actors and 17 actresses).
Presented in a random order, each photo had four possible
state descriptors one at each corner and only one of these
descriptors targeted the mental state depicted in the photo, while
the others were foils (Figure 1). Participants were required to
choose between these four descriptors which best described the
eyes expressions of the actor in the photo. Participants could take
TABLE 2 | Measures collected in HD and HS samples.
HD HS
RMET + +
UHDRS Motor Evaluation + −
TFC + −
MoCA + +
BDI-II + +
HD, Huntington Disease; HS, healthy subjects; RMET, Reading the mind in the
eyes test; UHDRS, Unified Huntington Disease Rating Scale; TFC, Total Functional
Capacity; MoCA, Montreal Cognitive Assessment; BDI-II, Beck Depression
Inventory II.
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FIGURE 1 | Reading the mind in the eyes test (RMET) task stimulus
example.
all time they needed to choose the descriptor and continued to
the following item only when ready. Performance was evaluated
by measuring the percentage of correct responses. The RMET test
is a simple but advanced ToM test and its internal consistency and
test–retest stability were good for the Italian population (Vellante
et al., 2013).
Cognitive Functioning
The MoCA, a brief 30-point test, was used to assess different
cognitive domains. Individual items on the MoCA were
divided into different cognitive-specific domains (attention,
executive function, visuospatial abilities, language, memory, and
orientation) based on previous research (Nasreddine et al.,
2005).
The short-term memory recall task (5 points) involves
two learning trials of five nouns and delayed recall after
approximately 5 min. Visuospatial abilities are assessed using
a clock-drawing task (3 points) and a three-dimensional cube
copy (1 point). Multiple aspects of EF are assessed using an
alternation task adapted from the Trail Making B task (1
point), a phonemic fluency task (1 point), and a two-item
verbal abstraction task (2 points). Attention, concentration, and
working memory are evaluated using a sustained attention task
(target detection using tapping; 1 point), a serial subtraction
task (3 points), and digits forward and backward (1 point each).
Language is assessed using a three-item confrontation naming
task with low-familiarity animals (lion, camel, rhinoceros; 3
points) and repetition of two syntactically complex sentences
(2 points). Finally, orientation to time and place is evaluated
(6 points). The MoCA proved to be an appropriate measure
for cognitive screening taking into account different cognitive
domains (Freitas et al., 2012).
Depression
To assess mood changes we used the Beck Depression Inventory
II (BDI-II) (Beck et al., 1996), a 21 items self-report rating
scale of depressive symptoms, such as irritability, low mood,
lack of interest in enjoyable activities, and fatigue. The BDI-II
is a relevant psychometric instrument, showing high reliability,
capacity to discriminate between depressed and non-depressed
subjects (Wang and Gorenstein, 2013).
Statistical Analysis
Chi-square test was applied to assess gender differences between
groups. Because of significantly non-normal distributions
(according to the Shapiro–Wilk statistical test), non-parametric
Mann–Whitney U-tests were used to analyze MoCA total scores,
MoCA sub-scores in each of the cognitive-specific domains and
RMET scores between groups (HD and HS). Regarding RMET,
to observe if any difference was present in HD subjects between
the two different stages of the disease, a further Mann–Whitney
U-tests was performed. For data in which normality was assumed
(BDI-II), a Student’s t-test for unpaired data was used to assess
differences between groups.
To disentangle whether ToM ability could be associated with
HD independently from years of education and affective status
(BDI-II), the association between the ToM score and case–
control status (HD and HS) was analyzed using logistic regression
models. Then, the contribution of the cognitive functioning
(total MoCA score) and of the six cognitive-specific domains
(attention, executive function, visuospatial, language, memory,
and orientation) was analyzed by running a Spearman correlation
analysis between RMET score (expressed as percentage of correct
responses), MoCA total score and MoCA sub-scores, separately
for HD and HS groups.
A standard statistical package computed odds ratios (ORs),
two-sided 95% confidence intervals (CIs) and P-values; P < 0.05
was considered to be significant.
All data analysis was performed using SPSS 22.0
RESULTS
Descriptive statistics for demographic and clinical data are
reported in Table 1. HD and HS groups were matched for
age, gender and education levels since no significant differences
emerged between groups (p always > 0.05). In HD patients,
TFC mean score was 10.91 (Range of 7–13) with nine subjects
in the mild (TFC = 10–13) and six subjects in the moderate
(TFC= 7–9) stages of the disease.
Statistical analysis on the percentage of correct responses at
the RMET test revealed a significant difference between HD and
HS groups (U = 9.50, p = 0.000001), showing that HD subjects
performed significantly worse than HS (Figure 2). Regarding HD
subjects, no difference between the two sub-groups of mild and
moderate stages of the disease (U = 18, p= 0.29) was present.
Regarding MoCA (Table 3), HD patients performed
significantly worse compared with HS. For total MoCA score,
statistical analysis revealed a significant difference between
groups (U = 3.50, p = 0.000006). The mean score for HD
patients was 19.67 (±5.12 SD) with a range of 8–26, while for
normal controls the average was 28.26 (±1.75 SD), ranging from
25 to 30.
The Mann–Whitney U-test showed that a significant
difference was present between HS and HD in all the MoCA
sub-scores (p always < 0.05) (Table 3).
Finally, regarding the specific measure of affective status (BDI-
II), unpaired t-test showed a significant difference between HD
patients and control subjects (p= 0.041).
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FIGURE 2 | Performance in the RMET in Huntington’s disease (HD)
patients and in healthy subjects (HS). On the ordinate, we report the % of
correct responses. Bars indicate standard error means (SEM).
Univariate logistic regression analysis showed a significant
and positive association between ToM ability and presence of
HD (Table 4). This association remained significant after having
adjusted for years of education and BDI-II (Table 4).
Neither in HD and HS, a significant correlation emerged
between MoCA (total score) and the percentage of correct
TABLE 3 | Neuropsychological assessment.
HD (n = 15) HS (n = 15) Student’s t-test
or Mann–Whitney
U-testMean ± SD Mean ± SD
BDI-II score 12.4 ± 11.5 5.6 ± 4.3 T: p = 0.041
MoCA Total score 19.87 ± 5.68 28.27 ± 1.75 U: p = 0.00014
MoCA Sub-score:
Memory
1.6 ± 1.45 3.87 ± 1.36 U: p = 0.00066
MoCA Sub-score:
Visuospatial abilities
2.47 ± 1.12 4 ± 0 U: p = 0.00011
MoCA Sub-score:
Executive function
1.79 ± 1.39 3.73 ± 0.46 U: p = 0.00015
MoCA Sub-score:
Attention
4.33 ± 1.68 5.93 ± 0.26 U: p = 0.0029
MoCA Sub-score:
Language
4.13 ± 0.99 4.8 ± 0.41 U: p = 0.044
MoCA Sub-score:
Orientation
5.13 ± 1.40 5.93 ± 0.26 U: p = 0.046
HD, Huntington Disease; HS, healthy subjects; BDI-II, Beck Depression Inventory
II; MoCA, Montreal Cognitive Assessment.
TABLE 4 | Logistic regression analysis of the association between ToM
ability and HD.
HD versus HS Wald Exp(b) p-value
RMET 7.40 2.54 p = 0.007
Adjusted for Education 6.19 2.99 p = 0.013
Adjusted for Education, BDI-II 5.38 2.80 p = 0.020
HD, Huntington Disease; HS, healthy subjects, RMET, Reading the mind in the eyes
test; BDI-II, Beck Depression Inventory II.
responses at the RMET (HD: Spearman’s ρ = 0.3094, p = 0.26,
HS: Spearman’s ρ = 0.1036, p = 0.24). However, when the
correlation was performed between the percentage of correct
responses at the RMET and each of the six sub-scores of MOCA
separately, RMET performance significantly correlated with the
visuospatial abilities score (Spearman’s ρ = 0.384, p = 0.018) in
HD (Figure 3), whereas no significant correlation was found in
HS (p always > 0.05).
DISCUSSION
The aim of this study was to assess whether the affective ToM
ability (tested by means of the RMET) was impaired in the
mild to moderate stages of HD, and whether there was an
association between compromised ToM ability and the presence
of cognitive impairment. We considered very important trying
to further clarify this possible association, since data in the
literature are conflicting (Allain et al., 2011; Eddy et al., 2014). In
a disease characterized by cognitive decline, including memory
and executive impairments and other psychiatric manifestations
(Asselen et al., 2012), it becomes crucial to understand if an
ability that is important for social interaction, such as affective
ToM ability, is influenced or not by the cognitive impairment.
However, it must be taken into account that our study is based
on a small sample of subjects and therefore results should be read
with caution.
To date, findings are consistent in showing that several facets
of social cognition, including emotion recognition, are impaired
in HD patients (Snowden et al., 2003). On this regard, it has
been demonstrated that even preclinical and early HD patients
had difficulties in recognizing emotional facial expression such
as disgust, fear and anger (Johnson et al., 2007). Our results
confirmed that HD patients in the mild to moderate stages of
the disease poorly performed in affective ToM task, indicating
that they had difficulties to infer other people’s emotional states.
Furthermore, our results showed that affective ToM performance
was not influenced by the depressive status even though there
were significant differences in the BDI-II mean score between
groups. Finally, in our sample of HD patients, ToM ability
did not correlate with global cognitive functioning as assessed
by MoCA total score, in accordance with the study of Allain
et al. (2011). However, analyzing more in details MoCA sub-
scores, the performance in RMET correlated with visuospatial
abilities, but not with EF. This latter result seems therefore in
contrast with a previous study in HD patients showing that
executive dysfunction correlated with RMET thus suggesting that
executive dysfunction could contribute to impaired affective ToM
performance (Eddy et al., 2014). On the other hand, our findings
are consistent with studies that dissociated the performance
of affective ToM and executive tasks in patients with severe
traumatic brain injury (Havet-Thomassin et al., 2006; Muller
et al., 2010), in patients with frontal variant of frontotemporal
dementia (Lough et al., 2001; Gregory et al., 2002), and even in
a group of HD patients, early in the course of the disease (Allain
et al., 2011). Indeed, cognitive rather than affective ToM seems
to be mediated by dorsolateral fronto-striatal circuit and thus to
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FIGURE 3 | Correlation between the visuospatial abilities score
(X-axis) and the percentage (%) of correct responses of the RMET
(Y-axis). Data of Huntington’s disease participants in the mild to moderate
stages of the disease are plotted together (gray circles).
be associated with executive dysfunction (Bodden et al., 2010a,b;
Yu et al., 2012). Here, by analyzing MoCA total score and sub-
scores, we found that only visuospatial abilities were associated to
the performance in affective ToM task. One possible explanation
for this result may deal with the nature of the RMET that requires
an accurate scanning of the eye region in order to judge complex
mental states from photographs of people’s eyes alone.
However, a recent study showed that symptomatic HD
patients presented an emotion recognition deficit with a normal
scanning pattern of the different regions of interest of the face
(Asselen et al., 2012). Noteworthy, Asselen et al. (2012) assessed
emotion recognition and eye movement patterns in a population
of early HD patients and whether difficulties in face scanning may
contribute to impaired emotion recognition in HD patients into
mild to moderate stage of the disease has not been elucidated so
far. One possible unifying explanation is that visuospatial deficits
might contribute to low scoring at the RMET, even if affective
ToM performances are more likely the results of higher order
processing impairments (Sprengelmeyer et al., 1996).
Theory of Mind is thought to be mediated by a complex
neuroanatomical network that includes the medial prefrontal
cortex, the superior temporal sulcus region, the temporo-
parietal junction, the temporal pole and the amygdala (Bodden
et al., 2010a). Further, the rostral frontal regions, such as the
orbitofrontal cortex send input to the striatum, giving rise to
the “limbic” fronto-striatal circuit (Lanciego et al., 2012). On this
basis, a contribution of basal ganglia to affective ToM ability has
been hypothesized (Abu-Akel, 2003).
Both pathological (Vonsattel et al., 1985; Mann et al., 1993)
and neuroimaging studies (Aylward et al., 1997) suggested that
HD is characterized by a marked atrophy of the striatum (caudate
and putamen). However, a recent imaging study showed that the
various clinical features observed in HD were related to regionally
specific lesions of cortico-basal ganglia networks rather than to
the striatum only (Delmaire et al., 2013). Particularly, apathy
correlated with structural abnormalities of the orbitofrontal
cortex that is interconnected with the limbic circuit of the basal
ganglia. In this scenario, we can hypothesize that affective ToM
impairment in HD could implicate a selective dysfunction in the
limbic (affective) cortico-basal ganglia-cortical circuit, and not in
the associative one. If this is the case, testing affective ToM by
means of RMET could be a useful tool to assess social cognition
even when the disease progresses and cognitive dysfunction
becomes more relevant.
Some limitations of this study deserve to be considered. The
first concerns the relatively small sample size of our HD group.
The lack of association of affective ToM with global cognitive
functioning (in particular with EF) needs to be replicated with a
larger number of participants in order to strengthen our findings.
Further, the relationship between deficits in visuospatial abilities
and impaired affective ToM performance might be explored
in future studies with more specific tests, in order to better
disclose their potential connection with affective ToM ability.
The hypothesis related to the involvement of limbic basal ganglia
circuit as neuroanatomical substrate of affective ToM impairment
in HD should be confirmed through imaging studies. Finally,
our research did not take into account the potential complex
interrelationships between neuropsychiatric symptoms (such as
irritability, aggression, and compulsive behaviors) (Van den Stock
et al., 2015; Eddy et al., 2016) and compromised affective ToM.
However, whether affective impairment, related to ToM, is a
major component of neuropsychiatric manifestations in HD
should be the subject of specific studies.
CONCLUSION
Our study showed that using RMET to assess affective ToM
ability could be a useful tool to evaluate HD patients who
are in different stages of the disease, independently from their
cognitive status. On this basis, affective ToM in HD might be
instrumental for explaining why patients with HD can experience
social difficulties and interpersonal problems, and, as a result,
in developing psycho-educational interventions. The lack of
relationship between affective ToM ability and global cognitive
function should be considered for a better management of the
different symptoms of the disease. In particular, when referring
to patients with social difficulties and interpersonal problems
we should consider that these symptoms are not influenced by
patients’ cognitive functioning. The social impairment should be
considered as a specific objective to work on, organizing patients’
management and therapeutic intervention.
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